Outcome
On §631, Otter argued it was the meeting host's recording tool. The court accepted that a vendor acting only as an extension of its customer is not a third-party interceptor, but held: "Because Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Otter independently collects, retains, and uses communications for its own commercial purposes, they have sufficiently alleged that Otter is a third-party eavesdropper under section 631" (at 16).
On standing, the court distinguished Popa v. Microsoft: the alleged intrusion was "materially more invasive than the monitoring of browsing activity in Popa", because it involved whole conversations on sensitive topics (at 5). On the Wiretap Act, Otter's commercial motive did not defeat the crime-tort exception at this stage, because "committing a tort and seeking a profit are not mutually exclusive" (at 11, quoting Riganian v. LiveRamp).
Specific facts mattered. Plaintiffs who called their meetings only "private" or "sensitive" lost their intrusion and §632 claims; the one who described a call with a medical professional kept them (at 13–14, 17). This is a pleading decision: the allegations are not findings.